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Abstract
Background: Recent research has suggested that perceived organizational connectivity may serve as an important
measure of public health preparedness. Presumably, organizations with higher perceived connectivity also have a
greater number of actual organizational ties. Using network analysis, we evaluate this presumption by assessing the
correlation between perceived organizational connectivity and reported inter-organizational connections.
Methods: During late 2007-early 2008, representatives from organizations involved in the delivery of public health
systems in Alberta were asked to complete an online questionnaire on public health preparedness. Organizational
jurisdictional information was collected. Items from Dorn and colleagues connectivity scale (2007) were used to
measure perceived organizational connectivity. Inter-organizational network data on formal connections in the area
of pandemic influenza preparedness were collected using a roster approach. These data were imported into
UCINET to calculate in- and out-degree centrality scores for each organization. One-way ANOVA tests assessed if
perceived connectivity and in- and out-degree centrality varied among jurisdictions. Pearson correlation coefficients
were used to assess the correlation of perceived connectivity and in- and out-degree centrality.
Results: Significant mean differences among jurisdictions were observed for in-degree (F(3,116) = 26.60, p < 0.001)
and between provincial and lower jurisdictions for out-degree centrality (F(3,116) = 5.24, p < 0.01). Higher
jurisdictions had higher average centrality. Perceived organizational connectivity was correlated with out-degree
(r(123) = 0.22, p < 0.05) but not in-degree centrality (r(123) = -0.07, p > 0.05).
Conclusions: The results suggest in terms of pandemic preparedness that perceived connectivity may serve as a
partial proxy measure of formal out-degree network connectivity.
Background
In a public health emergency, an immediate response is
required to mitigate the extent of injury, disease, disabil-
ity, and death suffered by the population. It is impera-
tive that agencies with overlapping responsibilities
coalesce quickly, provide care to those affected, imple-
ment control measures to minimize the scope of the
emergency, keep critical community services and busi-
nesses operational during the emergency, and restore
health and community services back to normal
operation[1]. Since the timing and location of most
emergencies are not predictable, agencies may not have
time to prepare during the midst of a crisis, rather they
must leverage information, assets, and response capacity,
and coordinate response initiatives to the current situa-
tion almost immediately[2]. Being connected to other
organizations is a critical element in the capacity of
agencies to access and mobilize resources within the
public health preparedness network.
Connectivity has been defined as a “seamless web of
people, organizations, resources, and information that
can best catch, contain, and recover from a terrorist
incident or other disaster.”[3] The concept has been
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coordination of the public health and emergency man-
agement network[3]. It has been reported that even if a
system has ample resources in terms of equipment,
training, and funding, these components will not func-
tion optimally if the system does not reach a threshold
level of connectivity[4]. If, however, organizations have
developed strong and mutual relationships, research
suggests that the system as a whole will likely manage
the crisis more efficiently and have greater capacity to
adapt and improvise should an unexpected event outside
of the specific action and contingency plans occur[3,4].
Recent research on organizational connectivity and
public health preparedness has suggested that perceived
organizational connectivity is a useful proxy indicator of
organizational preparedness[2]. Presumably, this is
because perceived connectivity indicates actual organiza-
tional connectivity. Indeed, in terms of accessing infor-
mation and resources through the system, what matters
during an emergency is not whether organizations per-
ceive themselves as connected but whether they actually
have those connections in place. In this study, we
address whether perceived organizational connectivity
serves as a proxy measure of formal ties objectively
reported or received by organizations with respect to
pandemic influenza preparedness. It is hypothesized that
perceived and network connectivity are correlated.
Of special interest about this study is the use of socio-
metric network data from over 100 public health and
emergency management agencies to assess inter-organi-
zational network connections. Inter-organizational net-
works consist of the relational ties among organizations
and the overall structure resulting from those intercon-
nections[5]. An inter-organizational network approach
reveals the degree of integration or fragmentation of ser-
vice delivery existing among organizations[6]. Integra-
tion refers to the extent of interconnectedness among
organizations, and service delivery outcomes are often
shown improved with greater integration[7,8]. Network
analysis can also provide insight into which organiza-
tions are more influential or prominent in the overall
system. Central actors are seen as those actors that are
more involved or prominent in the network. This form
of centrality is not the result of organizational percep-
tions. Instead, it emerges from how the various organi-
zations identify the types of connections they have to
other specific organizations. In this regard, centrality
can be distinguished between in-degree and out-degree
centrality. In-degree centrality measures the connections
that an organization receives from others within the net-
work while out-degree centrality measures the connec-
tions that an organization sends to or reports having to
other agencies within the network.
Given the greater costs and higher respondent burden
associated with administering and completing an inter-
organizational network questionnaire, information
gleaned from this analysis could be invaluable for the
development of questionnaires that provide similar
information but are less costly and have a lower respon-
dent burden. If we can show that perceived connectivity
parallels actual network connectivity, then the results of
this work could offer an effective and timely means of
assessing organizational connectivity, a critical compo-
nent of public health preparedness, without the need for
formal network analysis.
Methods
Sample description
The current work used data collected through the “Public
Health Preparedness and Responsiveness in Alberta: An
Inter-Organizational Relations Study of Public Health
Preparedness and Response Networks” research project.
Using a stratified random sampling technique, 595 orga-
nizations geographically spread across four jurisdictional
levels (provincial, regional, city, and town/village) were
invited to complete an online questionnaire. In an initial
census, these organizations were identified as potentially
playing a role in public health preparedness or emer-
gency management within the province. Email and regu-
lar mail invitations were sent to organizational
representatives who were asked to select the most appro-
priate person in their organization to complete the online
questionnaire.
Organizational questionnaire
The online organizational questionnaire was developed
specifically for this study to assess public health prepa-
redness in Alberta (see Additional file 1). Questionnaires
were completed between November 2007 and April
2008. The questionnaire asked organizational represen-
tatives about the general characteristics of organizations,
subjective assessments of the institutional environment,
and general perceptions of their system and organiza-
tional connectivity, and inter-organizational network
relations. A roster approach, in which organizations
were provided with a listing of organizations with which
they may have relations, was used to collect sociometric
network data. To facilitate response ease, the listing of
595 organizations was first divided into jurisdictional
and geographical areas. All respondents were first asked
if they had ties to organizations at provincial, sub-pro-
vincial, and city levels. Respondents were then asked if
they had formal ties to any organizations within separate
town/village areas grouped according to geographical
area. If they responded yes, they were presented the list-
ing of organizations within the town/village areas that
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tions at each level with which their own organization
had ties in terms of formal and informal relationships
and information sharing in relation to pandemic influ-
enza. Formal ties were those in which written responsi-
bilities and obligations had been developed. Informal
ties were those in which communication occurred
between agencies without official responsibilities or writ-
ten obligations.
Measures
Organizational connectivity
Perceived organizational connectivity was measured
using organizational connectivity items from the con-
nectivity instrument developed by Dorn and colleagues
[2]. Organizational connectivity items asked respondents
to assess their level of confidence on a four-point Likert
scale from not confident to very confident to 1) perform
the tasks that the organization is expected to accom-
plish, 2) make connections to other organizations for
which the organization is responsible, 3) provide assis-
tance and information to others, 4) acquire assistance
and information from others, 5) perform cooperative
and connected activities with other people and organiza-
tions, and 6) manage differences and disputes. A total
summative score was obtained for each responding
organization.
Organizational network connectivity was measured
using the Freeman centrality measure[9]. For non-
symmetric data (as is the case in our work), the in-
degree of an organization is the number of ties received
by the organization and the out-degree is the number of
ties initiated by the organization[9,10]. Network data on
the formal ties that organizations had to one another
with regards to pandemic influenza preparedness were
cleaned and imported to UCINET, version 6.211[10]. In-
degree and out-degree Freeman centrality scores were
calculated for each participating organization.
Organizational jurisdiction
Organizational jurisdiction was divided into four strata: 1)
provincial-level departments, 2) sub-provincial administra-
tive agencies, i.e., emergency management districts (disas-
ter services) and regional health authorities, 3) cities, and
4) towns and village areas. According to the 2006 Census
of Canada, the average population size of Alberta cities,
towns, and village areas was 136,613 people, 3,835 people,
and 400 people, respectively[11].
Statistical analysis
First, the internal consistency of the perceived organiza-
tional connectivity scale was calculated by means of
Cronbach’s alpha[12]. A high alpha (0.7 and higher) is
consistent with the hypothesis that all of the scale items
are measuring the same construct. Second, ANOVA
tests were performed to assess if there were significant
differences in network centrality scores among the four
jurisdictional levels. Third, Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients were computed between network centrality and
perceived organizational connectivity scores for the
entire sample. Statistical analyses were performed using
SPSS, version 16.0.
Funding and ethics
This project was funded by the Alberta Heritage Founda-
tion for Medical Research and received ethics approval
from the Office of Biomedical Ethics of the Faculty of
Medicine, University of Calgary and from the Health
Research Ethics Board of the Faculty of Medicine and
Dentistry, University of Alberta.
Results
Response rates and demographics
Of the 595 organizations invited to complete the organi-
zational questionnaire, a total of 135 organizational
representatives responded to the network assessment
component (Figure 1). Of those 135, 10 additional orga-
nizations had to be dropped from this analysis since
they did not provide perceived organizational connectiv-
ity information. Several departments chose to respond
as part of a larger organization or agency within a parti-
cular city or local region. At the town level, many orga-
nizations that were asked to participate did not see their
organization’s mission as concerning public health pre-
paredness and chose not to respond. In terms of respon-
dent coverage, the response percentage at each
jurisdictional level was as follows: provincial (45.2%),
regional (37.9%), city (30.7%), and town/village (20.9%).
Despite the low overall organizational-level response
rate, respondent data are geographically and jurisdic-
tionally spread across agencies involved in public health
preparedness. For example, in terms of geographical
sample coverage, 87.5% of Alberta cities and 69.1% of
the towns and villages sampled provided at least one
organizational respondent (Figure 2). In 68.8% of
the cases at the city level and 59.5% of the cases at the
town/village level, respondents represented fire depart-
ment or disaster services organizations. Descriptive sta-
tistics outlining perceived organizational connectivity
score, network connectivity scores (in-degree and out-
degree centrality), and scores stratified by jurisdictional
level are reported in Table 1.
Perceived organizational connectivity scale
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the perceived con-
nectivity scale was 0.93, showing high internal consis-
tency among the items. All items were positively
correlated to each other and the correlation coefficients
between the items ranged from 0.57 to 0.82.
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Three separate one-way between-subjects analysis of
variance (ANOVA) tests were conducted. The first
ANOVA test comparing perceived connectivity scores
across four jurisdictional levels showed that perceived
organizational connectivity did not differ significantly
among levels. The second ANOVA test examining dif-
ferences in in-degree centrality scores across jurisdic-
tional levels found that in-degree centrality did vary
significantly among levels (F(3,116) = 26.60, p < 0.001).
The third ANOVA test comparing out-degree centrality
scores across jurisdictional levels also found out-degree
to vary significantly (F(3,116) = 5.24, p < 0.01) with dif-
ferences existing solely between provincial and all the
lower levels.
Correlation analysis
A Pearson correlation matrix of perceived connectivity
score and network connectivity scores (in- and out-
degree centralities) is displayed in Table 2. Perceived
connectivity was significantly correlated with out-degree
centrality (r(123) = 0.22, p < 0.05), but not with
in-degree centrality (r(123) = -0.7, p > 0.05). In-degree
and out-degree centralities were also significantly corre-
lated with each other (r(123) = 0.24, p < 0.01).
Discussion
Perceived organizational connectivity was correlated
with out-degree network centrality but not in-degree
centrality. These results suggest that perceived organiza-
tional connectivity may serve as a partial proxy measure
of formal ties objectively reported, but not received, by
organizations with respect to pandemic influenza prepa-
redness. This finding makes intuitive sense since ties
that other organizations report to an organization of
interest may not be recognized or reciprocated. This
may explain why in-degree centrality is not statistically
associated with organizational connectivity perceptions.
Out-degree centrality may beb i a s e db yo r g a n i z a t i o n ’s
perceptions of their own influence in a way in which
in-degree scores are not.
Further understanding of these results can be gained
through consideration of the concept of cognitive accu-
racy. Krackhardt (1990) defined cognitive accuracy as
t h ed e g r e et ow h i c hap e r s o n ’s perceived networks cor-
respond to actual networks[13]. His work concluded
Figure 1 Formal ties pandemic influenza respondent network (n = 135). Names of individual organizations are not provided due to
confidentiality agreements associated with the data collection
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other actors in the network was positively associated
with actual influence in the network. Choi and Brower
(2006) extended the concept of cognitive accuracy to
collective cognitive accuracy in their research assessing
local emergency management systems in Florida[14].
Collective cognitive accuracy shows how well partici-
pants are aware of the networks in practice and which
participants are influential within each network. It is cal-
culated as a simple percentage of the responding organi-
zations that accurately identify the influence of an
organization within a network (as compared to the
relationships identified through a formal network analy-
sis)[14]. Choi and Brower’s work supported the conclu-
sion that collective cognitive accuracy has a strong
positive relationship with the centrality of networks, and
that when actors have a clear mental picture of the net-
work, greater collaboration and information sharing is
observed, resulting in more effective decision making
and actions[14]. Unlike the current results however,
these authors noted a strong correlation with in-degree
centrality. One possible explanation for this discrepancy
is that the networks in Choi and Brower’sw o r kw e r e
decentralized horizontal networks with distributed
power and authority structures, rather than the primar-
ily hierarchically-linked organizations that were the sub-
ject of our work. The scope of the network in Choi and
Brower’s work was focused at the local level only while
our work had a much larger network structure, focused
at multiple jurisdictional levels. Furthermore, Carley,
Lee, and Krackhardt (2001) have previously shown that
distributed decentralized networks exhibit dynamic pat-
terns which are very different than those found in hier-
archical networks[15]. These differences in structural
dynamics may offer an explanation as to why in-degree
centrality was significantly correlated with organizational
connectivity in our work, rather than out-degree central-
ity. Further research is needed to examine these inter-
organizational relationships in greater detail.
Using an organizational network analysis approach pro-
vides insight into the overall structure and types of rela-
tionships existing in the public health preparedness system
in Alberta for pandemic influenza. This work helps
address a general gap in the public health field related to
organizational network analysis, identified by Luke and
Harris (2007) in their work on network analysis methods
and applications in public health, in that it helps provide a
structural evaluation of public health systems[16]. With
the recent shift and emphasis on using a systems approach
to design, study, and evaluate public health programs,[16]
the findings of this study offer a technical means of asses-
sing the extent to which each organization in a network is
linked to others and the patterns of relationships among
different organizations for one specific case example on
pandemic influenza. Not only do these findings provide a
means of illustrating how organizations function together
as a unit, but it serves to offer an effective and timely
means of assessing organizational connectivity, a critical
component of public health preparedness. Moreover, for-
mally identifying organizational connections using out-
degree centrality scores or using the partial proxy measure
of perceived connectivity provides a valuable tool for iden-
tifying the prominence of organizations in a network.
This information can aid policymakers in developing stra-
tegies for collaboration that build on the current strengths
of highly connected and central organizations while
Table 1 Alberta public health preparedness sample:
Descriptive statistics (n = 125)
Variable Mean (Standard
Deviation)
Perceived Organizational Connectivity Score 16.88 (3.92)
Perceived Organizational Connectivity Score by
Jurisdiction
- Provincial 16.81 (3.80)
- Regional 17.32 (4.20)
- City 17.70 (3.77)
- Town/Village 16.16 (3.79)
Network Connectivity Scores
- In-Degree Centrality 4.32 (5.54)
- Out-Degree Centrality 4.32 (7.65)
In-Degree Centrality by Jurisdiction†
- Provincial 12.26 (8.20)
- Regional 5.06 (2.39)
- City 3.48 (2.37)
- Town/Village 1.71 (0.94)
Out-Degree Centrality by Jurisdiction*
- Provincial 16.31 (13.52)
- Regional 5.07 (6.12)
- City 6.33 (5.45)
- Town/Village 6.04 (5.12)
† Significant mean differences among all jurisdiction levels (ANOVA tests)
* Significant mean difference between provincial and lower jurisdictional
levels only (ANOVA tests)
Table 2 Pearson correlation matrix of perceived
connectivity score, in-degree centrality score, and
out-degree centrality score
Perceived
Connectivity
In-Degree
Centrality
In-Degree Centrality -0.07 —
Out-Degree Centrality 0.22* 0.24**
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
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eral organizations[7,16,17].
Analysis of variance tests revealed statistically signifi-
cant differences in in-degree and out-degree centrality
measures by jurisdictional level. Differences were
observed among all jurisdictional level combinations for
in-degree centrality as well as between provincial and
each of regional, city, and town/village levels with
respect to out-degree centrality. In each case, the higher
jurisdictional level had a significantly higher centrality
score indicating these organizations were more con-
nected to surrounding organizations. This finding would
seem to confirm the hierarchical character of the prepa-
redness system in Alberta as organizations at higher jur-
isdictions receive and report greater formal connections.
Limited literature exists which assesses the role of
jurisdiction on centrality, connectivity, coordination, or
specific preparedness measures for public health organi-
zations, making it challenging to provide support for the
current results. Also, unique to the current work is the
depth of coverage of the inter-organizational network for
pandemic influenza at four jurisdictional levels. Most
other studies have typically compared only two levels, for
example local and state, or county and regional levels
[18,19]. In general, however, our results are supported by
recent work in Florida examining emergency manage-
ment networks. According to this work, smaller munici-
palities have primarily relied upon counties or regional
network supports for disaster-related functions since
higher jurisdictional levels are better prepared for mana-
ging emergencies[20]. Networking is advantageous
because links form between individuals and agencies that
would work together during a public health emergency
and this serves to heighten capacity and address metro-
politan fragmentation issues which are often present at
lower jurisdictional levels[18]. Other U.S. research has
indicated that aside from major metropolitan areas, few
counties, cities, or towns have the capacity to respond to
public health emergencies independently since they lack
the necessary coordination or supports with other agen-
cies[18]. The greater interconnectedness observed at
higher jurisdictional levels in the current work is impor-
tant as it may enhance communication, likely decreases
coordination problems during the time of an emergency,
and builds cohesion that could enhance preparedness.
There are several limitations of this work worth consid-
ering. First, the study compares perceived connectivity
with network centrality arising from an organization’s
formal ties and relationships. Although we found out-
degree centrality based on formal ties correlated with
perceived connectivity, it is conceivable that other
dimensions of inter-organizational relationships, such as
information or material-resource sharing, may or may
not be correlated with perceived connectivity in the same
fashion. Further research is needed to examine if per-
ceived connectivity is more closely linked to other
dimensions of inter-organizational relationships. Second,
this study is of one specific provincial preparedness net-
work. Since the conclusion of data collection for this pro-
ject, Alberta has reorganized its public health delivery
system, particularly at the regional level. As a result, the
type of network connections described in this study may
not be the same as those currently in place. Finally, this
is a cross-sectional analysis and the network data are
from one moment in time. Yet, the networks in which
organizations are embedded are dynamic[15]. With
recent emphases on preparedness planning, the develop-
ment of action plans, and the increased use of simulation
exercises, networks are continually evolving to reflect the
changing landscape. The Alberta sample is no exception,
and while data is collected from one time period there
remains value in studying the structure and composition
of the Alberta preparedness network as it existed in late
2007-early 2008. This makes possible in part the further
monitoring of how relationships form and become
institutionalized[14]. Future research can use such infor-
mation as a starting point for designing network- or
system-level surveillance systems of organizational prepa-
redness and conduct more dynamic analyses using longi-
tudinal data on the structure of preparedness and
response networks. While this study was conducted prior
to the current H1N1 outbreak, examining how this
recent event has tested the public health system and the
connectivity within it would be a logical next step as
investigators would likely find today a very different con-
nectivity and set of patterns in the field.
Conclusions
The current work assessed the relationship between per-
ceptions of organizational connectivity and the objective
assessment of connectivity revealed through network
analysis and centrality measures. First, correlation analy-
sis results suggested that perceived organizational con-
nectivity serves as a partial proxy measure of formal ties
objectively reported, but not received, by organizations
with respect to pandemic influenza preparedness in
Alberta. Whether perceived connectivity and its network
correlate of out-degree centrality provide a more valid
indicator of preparedness than in-degree centrality, for
example, remains a subject for future research. A practi-
cal application stemming from this study’sf i n d i n g si s
that organizations involved in preparedness activities
might use perceived connectivity as an efficient, effec-
tive, and timely measure of organizational connectivity.
These measures can be collected through a brief organi-
zational survey which asks six questions related to per-
ceptions of connectivity rather than performing a formal
network analysis. This is an invaluable exercise since
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nected to the system through a brief survey will possibly
allow more time to address those gaps before they
become a burden during an emergency. Second, signifi-
cant differences in centrality scores were observed by
jurisdictional level with higher jurisdictional organiza-
tions displaying greater degrees of connectedness on
average. Since lower jurisdictional agencies appear less
well connected in the system, this information can be
used to build more effective community-based coali-
tions. In other words, these organizations should be tar-
geted for programs that develop and foster their
connections with other surrounding organizations.
Improving formal ties should allow for greater colla-
boration, open communication, teamwork, and heigh-
tened overall response capacity and better allow the
system to respond with flexibility and resilience during a
public health emergency.
Additional file 1: Alberta public health preparedness organizational
survey. BMCPH Organizational survey
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1471-2458-10-
124-S1.PDF]
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